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EDUARDO M. PE$JALVER

Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying
Tort Principles to the Problem of
Climate Change
ABSTRACT
The problem of climate change continues to be an intractableone
for policymakers. Uncertaintiesover the likely costs of climate
change as well as over the costs of proposed remedies have hampered the formation of a consensus regardingthe best course of
action. The principles of tort law provide a useful means of
analyzing the problem of climate change, particularlythe issue of
who should bear the costs associatedwith its effcts. The two major
goals of tort law (reducing the costs of accidents and corrective
justice) both point towards the appropriatenessof placing the costs
of climate change on those who manufacturefossil fuels. Several
obstacles, particularlyissues of causation, stand in the way of a tort
analysis of climate change. These obstacles can be overcome
through a philosophicallysound approach to the issue of causation
and the adoption of a system ofproportionalliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
No environmental problem looms larger than the threat of global
climate change. In terms of sheer scale, the harm it portends dwarfs almost
all other environmental concerns. Despite the enormous havoc that may
ensue from climatic disruptions caused by the unchecked build-up of
"greenhouse gases" in the atmosphere, policymakers have proven to be
incapable of reaching any consensus on the appropriate action to reduce
emissions.1 Although in 1992 the United States pledged to stabilize its
emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000, its CO2 emissions have continued
to increase steadily.2
* The author is a third year student at Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut. I
would like to thank Judge Guido Calabresi and Professor Daniel Esty for their valuable
comments and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., John H. Cushman Jr., Intense Lobbying Against Global Warming Treaty, N.Y.
Tams, Dec. 7,1997, at A28 (describing lobbying by "powerful business interests" against any
mandatory reductions in greenhouse emissions); John H. Cushman Jr. & David E.Sanger, No
Simple Fight: The Forces that Shaped the Clinton Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1997, at GW3
(describing the conflict-ridden evolution of President Clinton's proposed U.S.position for the
December 1997 Kyoto conference).
2. See John H. Cushman Jr., U.S. Says Its GreenhouseGas EmissionsAre at Highest Rate in
Years, N.Y. TIMs, Oct. 21,1997, at A22.
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The United States and the international community have considered several policy responses. Voluntary reductions, carbon taxes,
emissions trading, and government subsidies to alternative energy have all
been proposed as means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, with none
of them gaining widespread support.3 Uncertainty over the costs of global
climate change and of the policies proposed to halt it, as well as strong
opposition from wealthy oil companies, have impeded the formulation of
a viable climate-change policy.4
This article argues that an analysis based on the model of tort
liability can contribute to the ongoing debate over the proper policy
response to climate change. By exploring the issue of anthropogenic climate
change in terms of the allocation of accident costs and corrective justice,
two concepts at the heart of tort law, it attempts to point toward one
possible way out of the current political deadlock.' Although these
concepts have been particularly salient with American tort law, and are
thus perhaps most helpful when considering the shape of climate change
policies within the United States, they also present a useful method of
analysis that could be extended to international solutions as well.
Part II briefly explores the basic science of climate change,
emphasizing three features of the problem: (1) the strong link between
carbon dioxide (CO2) and climate change; (2) the locally uneven effects of
climatic disruptions; and (3) the uncertainties in our current understanding.
Part III argues that the features of climate change make tort law an
appropriate framework for developing a policy response. In particular, I
discuss climate change in relation to two major goals of tort law: reduction
of accident costs and corrective justice. Part IV addresses some of the
obstacles to a tort approach to climate change: establishing causation,
calculating the proper remedies, and choosing a structure for implementing
a tort-based approach. The greatest of these problems is that of causation.
Many of the causation problems, however, result from tort law's stubborn
adherence to an outmoded, mechanistic understanding of causation. A
sound approach to causation, one based upon a statistical probability,

3. See William K. Stevens, Doubts on Cost Are Bedeviling Climate Policy,N.Y. TIME, Oct.
6, 1997, at A16.
4. See id. See also Industry Battles Clinton on Climate, UPI, Sept. 10,1997 (describing a $13
million industry campaign to prevent the United States from endorsing steep reductions in
CO2 emissions).
5. Please note that I am not suggesting that a tort approach can be a complete solution
to the problem of climate change. It might, however, represent a first step toward a
comprehensive climate change policy involving a whole range of actions to combat CO2
emissions. In any event, many other tools are necessarily involved in solving the problem of
climate change. I merely suggest that a policy modeled after tort liability is one of those tools,
one that has been neglected by policymakers to date.
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would substantially reduce these difficulties. Finally, in Part V, the article
concludes by discussing how a tort-based policy could work in conjunction
with a carbon tax to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
II. THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE
This part discusses the current state of scientific knowledge on the
problem of climate change. Its goal is not to present a comprehensive
analysis of the voluminous literature on this subject.' Instead, it seeks
simply to provide a brief outline of the factual assumptions upon which my
analysis is based. Much of the information in this paper derives from
Climate Change 19957 a report produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), a committee created by the United Nations in 1988
to assess the scientific data on global climate change and its likely effects.'
A. The Causes of Climate Change
Although there is debate over whether or not climate change is
already taking place, there is a growing consensus among scientists that the
first signs of human effects on the global climate are starting to appear.9
The IPCC has concluded, "the balance of evidence suggests that there is a
discernible human influence on global climate."" This paper assumes that
the first signs of global climate change are beginning to emerge and are
likely to grow more serious if not addressed in the near future.1
Put simply, anthropogenic climate change-as distinguished from
the natural variability of the earth's climateu-results from the release of
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Greenhouse gases impede the
escape of infrared radiation from the Earth into space, causing a net

6.

For such a comprehensive overview, see CLMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF

CLMATE CHANGE (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 1995.
7. For a skeptical account of the climate change problems, see ROBERT C. BAuLING, THE
HEATED DEBATE: GREENHOUSE PREDICTIONS vs. CLIMATE REALITY (1992). Balling's work has
been harshly crticized by Ross Gelbspan, who accuses him of being a pawn of the oil industry.
See Ross Gelbspan, Disinformadionon Global WarmingInterests, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 13,1997,
at Forum 1. Gelbspan discloses that Balling has received "nearly $300,000 from coal and oil
interests in research funding." id. Climate Change 1995.
8. See CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, at vii.
9. See id. at 5.

10. Id.
11. See id.
12. Natural variability in the earth's climate may be due to such factors as variations in
the sun's radiation and in the earth's orbit, volcanic eruptions, and "complex interactions
between components of the climate system such as the atmosphere and ocean." Id. at 14. See
also William J. Broad, Another PossibleClimate Culprit:the Sun, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,1997, at Fl.
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increase in the heat retained by the Earth. The most important of the
greenhouse gases is CO 2, which is responsible for over half of the human
influence on the global climate.' But other gases, such as methane (CH4)
and nitrous oxide (N20), also contribute to climate change.14 Carbon
dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere have increased from approximately 280 parts per million by volume (ppmv) before the industrial
revolution to 358 ppmv by 1994.15 This increase is undoubtedly due to
human activity. 6 Over 80 percent of the increase in CO2 results from the
burning of fossil fuels, with the remaining increase coming largely from
changes in land use.1 This article will focus almost exclusively on fossil
fuel burning as the cause of climate change."'
B. The Effects of Climate Change: Global, but Local
Climate change is the most global of environmental problems. It is
global both in its causes and in the distribution of its effects. The behavior
responsible for global climate change (for example, fossil fuel burning in
automobiles and power plants) takes place on every continent. Similarly,
its effects (for example, rising oceans) will occur around the planet.19
Nevertheless, many of the results of climate change will be
intensely local. Although climate change will occur on a global level, its
2 Part of this local
effects will likely vary greatly on the local leveLw
variation
results from the distinction between climate and weather.21 A small change
in global climate may reflect enormous and varied changes in local weather
patterns.' For example, global climate change may lead to an increase in

13. See CUMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 6, at 117. The importance of CO,to climate
change is not a function of its effectiveness as a greenhouse gas as much as a reflection of the
volume by which it has increased (and continues to increase). See id. at 22,92. Methane, for
example, is (in the short term) 56 times more powerful as a greenhouse gas than CO,,but it
is present in far smaller amounts in the atmosphere, and is not increasing in concentration as
rapidly as CO. See id.
14. See id. at 117.
15. See id. at 14.
16. See id. at 14,78.
17. For example, deforestation. See id. at 79.
18. The same analysis, however, could be applied to other causes of climate change as

well.
19. Cf. William K Stevens, Experts on Climate Change Ponder: How Urgent IsIt?, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 9,1997, at Cl (discussing the likely global effects of climate change).
20. See CLUMATE CHANGE 1995, supranote 6, at 6 ("Regional temperature changes could
differ substantially from the global mean value.").
21. See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, Who CaresAbout a Few Degrees?, N.Y. IME, Dec. 1,1997,
at GW1 (discussing the difference between climate [large scale patterns in weather) and day
to day weather [the particular manifestations of those patterns]).
22. Seeid.
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the frequency of extreme weather. 3 The damage from increased rainstorms
and snowstorms, and thus from global climate change, will be borne
disproportionately by those communities with the misfortune to find
themselves in the path of individual storms.
The manner in which people experience climate change will also
vary locally because of the particular nature of some of the predicted
effects. The IPCC, for example, predicts that global climate change will lead
to a rise in sea levels of up to one meter by the end of the next century.24
Such a rise would disproportionately damage communities living on or
near coastal areas. Likewise, warmer temperatures could increase the
geographic range of tropical diseases (for example, malaria),' People living
in certain regions previously unaffected by such diseases would endure a
particularly acute local manifestation of climate change.
C. Uncertainty
A final feature of climate change of particular importance to this
article is the high level of uncertainty associated with predictions of specific
consequences of changes in global climate. The substantial uncertainties
surrounding various facets of the climate change problem can be divided
into two general categories.
First, there are broad uncertainties regarding the functioning of the
climate system on a global level.' These uncertainties hinder precise
prediction of the aggregate and regional effects of global climate change.'
Lack of scientific knowledge as to the likely effects of countless feedback
mechanisms engenders uncertainty within the models used to predict the
future path of the global climate. The uncertainty is particularly strong with
regard to predictions of effects at the regional leveL' Uncertainty about the
global course of climate change is also associated with uncertainty
regarding its likely overall economic costs.' By economic costs, I mean

23. See Stevens, supra note 19.
24.

See CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 6, at 3941.

25.

See GLOBAL WARMING at NRDC: The Consequences of Global Warming (visited Oct.

9,1997) <http://www.nrdcorg/bkgrd/gwcons.html>.
26. For example, the IPCC report predicts that the global mean temperature will increase
anywhere from one degree Celsius to three degrees Celsius by 2100. See CLIMATE CHANGE
1995, supranote 6, at 6. This type of uncertainty could be called "general uncertainty."
27. See id.
28. See William K. Stevens, Computers Model World's Climate, but How Well? N.Y. TIME,
Nov. 4,1997, at Fl.
29. See, e.g., Stevens, supranote 3 (quoting Harvard economist Dale Jorgenson as saying
that "[t]here's a lot more uncertainty about the economics [of climate change) than about the
climate."). This uncertainty relates both to the costs produced by climate change itself (and
hence the benefits of avoiding climate change) as well as the economic costs of the measures
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both the direct damage produced by climatic change (for example, storm
damage) and the costs of adapting to changes in global climate (for
example, the costs of moving people away from coastal areas, shifting
locations of food production, etc.). Uncertainty about these economic
effects of climate change has played a large role in the failure to develop a
coherent policy response to the problem."° Uncertainties falling within this
first category will probably be gradually reduced over time as human
understanding and technology improve."
A second type of uncertainty, however, is unlikely to disappear
any time in the near future. This more persistent uncertainty surrounds the
specific effects of global climate change. If the first type of uncertainty is
exemplified by questions such as how much the overall frequency of severe
weather will increase because of climate change, the second type of
uncertainty can be exemplified in the related, but fundamentally different,
question of precisely when and where the additional severe weather will
occur. 2 I call this second type of uncertainty "specific uncertainty."
Specific uncertainty can in turn be divided into two subcategories:
first, ex ante questions of prediction; and, second, ex post questions of
assigning responsibility. Ex ante questions of prediction involve attempts
to determine before the fact when, where, and to whom specific effects will
occur. Ex post questions involve attempts to determine which particular
harms were caused by climate change, as against background causes.3
Even if, for example, scientists were able to predict with a high degree of
certainty that global climate change would create a 20 percent increase in

the frequency of winter cyclones in the North Pacific over the next 30 years,
there is currently no way to know with complete certainty (1) before the

proposed for reducing the threat of climate change. For a more detailed discussion of the
economic costs of carbon taxes, one of the most frequently proposed means of reducing
carbon emissions, see Dale W. Jorgenson & Peter J.Wilcoxen, Global Change, Energy Prices,&
U.S.Economic Growth, 3 STRUCtURAL CHANGE AND ECON. DYNAMICS 135 (1991) and Andrew
Dean & Peter Hoeller, The Costs of Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions, OECD ECON. STUD.,
Winter 1992, at 16.
30. See Stevens, supranote 27.
31. See, e.g., id. (discussing how climate models have steadily improved over the past few
decades).
32. This uncertainty therefore translates into a pervasive uncertainty about who precisely
will bear the brunt of damage caused by climate change.
33. Weather events caused by El Nifto provide a useful example of such a distinction.
One can easily distinguish between the different types of uncertainty in discussions of the El
Nifto phenomenon. First, uncertainty over estimates of the aggregate climatic effects and
economic costs attributable to El Nino would fall into the category of general uncertainty.
Second, uncertainty over when and where a particular "El Niio storm" will occur would fall
under the ex ante half of specific uncertainty. Finally, uncertainty over post hoc descriptions
of a storm as an "El Niflo storm" would fall under the ex post half of specific uncertainty.
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fact, where and when the additional cyclones would occur or (2) after the
fact, vhich particular cyclones were "in fact" due to climate change and
which were due to "background" climatic processes. This specific
uncertainty results from the deep complexity and sensitivity of the
processes that produce weather, features that underlie the common
characterization of weather as a chaotic system.' Such a characterization
calls into question the likelihood that it is even possible to eliminate specific
uncertainty.

III. A TORT ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
A. The Appropriateness of a Tort Analysis
The nature of anthropogenic climate change suggests the appropriateness of applying tort principles to the problem. First, many of the costs
of global climate change will take the form of damage to persons and
property produced as a result of human activity, a concem that lies at the
heart of tort law. The uneven nature of the effects of climate change reinforces the attractiveness of tort law as a potentially useful analytic tool.
Because some extremely localized groups will likely bear a grossly disproportionate share of the costs produced by climate change (for example,
people living in coastal areas or people suffering from malaria in previ-

ously temperate regions or people struck by a tornado that might not otherwise have occurred), the question of whether to leave these costs on the
victims or somehow to transfer them to others comes into play. This distri-

butional question is of central concern to the tort system.m Tort analysis
provides the potential for a policy response to anthropogenic climate
change that is sensitive to the diversity of individuallosses likely to result

34.

See, e.g., JOHN DUPRE, THE DSORDER OF THINGS METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE

DisuNiry OF ScINcE 175 (1993) (describing meteorological systems as paradigms of chaotic
systems, Le., systems in which prediction is impossible due to their enormous complexity and
sensitivity).
35. I do not want to overplay the distinction between general and specific uncertainty.
Reducing general uncertainty can, for example, also reduce specific uncertainty to a degree.
If for example, scientists knew (with a high degree of certainty) that hurricanes in Florida
would increase 800% by the year 2008 due to climate change, it would be possible to
characterize a particular hurricane in Florida as a "climate change storm" with a higher
degree of certainty than if scientists could only predict the effect of climate change on
hurricane frequency (in general) to a very low degree of certainty. Nevertheless, the
distinction between general and specific uncertainty is a useful one, especially when
considering issues surrounding causation. See infra Part W.A.
36. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDEI S: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIc
ANALYSIS 26 (1970) (describing "fairness" in the distribution of accident costs as one of the
fundamental goals of tort law).
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from the human emission of greenhouse gases. It also provides a useful
framework for analyzing the best ways to allocate costs associated with
similar-looking
harms that, in fact, result from a series of different
37
sources.

Furthermore, from a pragmatic viewpoint, a tort analysis may
provide a workable framework for proposing policy initiatives. That is to
say, tort law's language of forcing injurers to compensate victims of harm
may provide a more palatable language for selling action on climate change
to the American public than, for example, the language of taxation or
regulation. Carbon taxes, one of the most common proposals for dealing
with climate change," would by themselves likely prove very difficult to
sell, given the present anti-tax sentiment within the United States.3 A tortbased policy, framed in terms of environmental restitution, on the other
hand, might more successfully ganer support.' Thus, Strauss and
Urquhardt argue that public antipathy for gasoline taxes results from their
perception as primarily fiscal measures, designed simply to raise money for
the government at large.4" A tort-based climate change policy, however,
could unequivocally be portrayed as an environmental measure. Phrased
in terms of protecting the environment and compensating the victims of
human activity, it would likely not arouse the same passions as a simple
rise in gasoline taxes.'
B. The Costs of Climate Change and the Goals of Tort Law
In considering who should bear the costs of damage to persons and
property produced by climate change, it is helpful to focus on the two commonly identified goals of tort law: reducing the costs of accidents, that is

37. See infra Part IV.B.1 for a discussion of the various splitting rules that have evolved
within tort law to resolve problems associated with categories of effects that are associated
with more than one type of cause.
38. See, e.g., Dean & Hoelier, supra note 29 (discussing the carbon tax).
39. In the United States over the past few years, the tendency has been towards low
taxes on fossil fuels. During the last presidential election, for example, candidates from both
parties sought to lower the tax on gasoline in order to curry favor with an electorate that is
increasingly hostile to taxation. See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Democrats Rejecta Dole Plan to Cut Gas
Tax, N.Y. TIS,May 10, 1996, at A28 (describing political sparring over the proposed cut in

the gas tax).
40. See Todd Strauss & John A. Urquhart, Energy Prices and Environmental Costs, in
217,221 (Daniel C. Esty & Marian I- Chertow eds., 1997).
41. See id.
42. See id. at 222 ("The only way to overcome the political hurdles associated with energy
taxes is to make the case on environmental grounds.").
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the sum of accident and accident-avoidance costs; and corrective justice.'
The application of either of these two goals to the problem of climate
change justifies a policy that places the costs upon those parties that extract
fossil fuels from the earth and convert them into usable form. As the
following analysis shows, such an approach would lead to a more efficient
level of fossil fuel consumption and would satisfy principles of corrective
justice.
1. Reducing the Costs of Accidents
Reduction of total accident costs is commonly seen as one of the
main goals of tort law." This goal is most logically served by an economic
approach and is often associated with the strict liability model of tort
compensation.' Under an economic approach to the problem of accident
cost reduction, the preferred assignment of liability would be the one that
minimizes the sum of misallocation costs and transaction costs."
Misallocation costs result when, because of positive transaction costs, more,
or fewer, accidents occur than would in the optimal state of affairs.
In the Coasian world of zero transaction costs (which includes
perfect consumer knowledge), and disregarding wealth effects, the decision
of who should bear the costs of harm caused by climate change would have
no impact on the level of activities that result in climate change (for
example, the burning of fossil fuels).47 Parties would simply bargain
around legal entitlements with the end result being the same level of
activities. If the costs were left on the victims of harms caused by climate
change, that is, if producers of fossil fuels were given the right to extract
and sell fossil fuels, potential victims-in this case, all consumers-would
band together to pay for reductions in the use of fossil fuels until the
marginal cost of reducing fossil fuel consumption exceeded the savings due
to the reduction in expected accident costs produced by the marginal
reduction in the use of fossil fuels. This equilibrium point is represented by
point C on Figure 1.
If, on the other hand, costs were put on the producers of fossil fuels
(that is, if victims were granted the right to be free from the effects of
anthropogenic climate change), then the producers would pay consumers
to reduce their fossil fuel use until the marginal cost of a decrease in

43. See CALABRESI, supra note 36, at 24-31 (discussing justice and reduction of accident
costs as the two main goals of tort law).
44. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi &Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Testfor Strict Liability in Torts,
81 YALE LJ. 1053, 1075 (1972) (arguing that strict liability better accomplishes the goal of
accident cost reduction).
45. See id.
46. See A. MnTHELLPO.N-KY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw Am EcoNoMIcs 13 (1983).
47. See id. at 17.
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consumption was greater than the savings in costs due to the harm avoided
by that reduction in fossil fuel consumption. Again, this equilibrium point
would be represented by point C on Figure 1. Thus, in a world of perfect
knowledge and no other transaction costs, the two alternative assignments
of liability would result in the same level of fossil fuel consumption and
expected costs of harms due to climate change.
In the real world of high transaction costs and less than perfect
consumer knowledge, however, placing the costs of harms caused by
anthropogenic climate change on those who suffer losses as a result of
those harms insures that the activities causing climate change occur at a
higher than optimal level. This result comes about because groups of
victims and potential victims of accidents will not be able to organize, due
to both their numbers and the specific uncertainty as to the accidents that
will be caused by climate change. Further, the fossil fuel companies have
engaged in activities aimed at preventing collective public action to combat
the threat of climate change. Thus, if costs are placed on victims, the price

48. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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of fossil fuels will not include the costs of harms caused by anthropogenic
climate change, because of the legal assignment of the entitlement in favor
of the producer; nor will victims be able to band together to pay for
reduction in fossil fuel consumption, because of their lack of knowledge
and poor organization. Instead, the costs of the harms produced by climate
change will stand as an externality, borne by the victims and their
insurers.49 The result will be higher than optimal consumption of fossil
fuels and hence higher than optimal "accident" costs.
As Calabresi argues, this externality is avoided by allocating the
costs of accidents to the party with the lowest transaction costs. According
to his theory of strict liability, accident costs should be allocated to the
party in the best position to make the required cost-benefit analysis
between increased consumption of the product and the increased costs of
accidents caused by that consumption, and then to act on that analysis." In
so doing, misallocation costs and transaction costs are minimized.
In the case of climate change, the party with the lowest transaction
costs, that is, the party in the best position to carry out the required cost
benefit analysis and then act on it, is the fossil fuel industry."1 First, and
perhaps most important, the fossil fuel companies have an enormous
amount of resources with which they can purchase the expertise needed to
assess the often conflicting information about climate change and its
expected costs. Second, once they have carried out the cost-benefit analysis,
fossil fuel companies are better positioned to internalize the accident costs
produced as a result of fossil fuel use, by incorporating the costs of
expected accidents into the price of fossil fuels.'
Forcing producers of fossil fuels to internalize the costs of accidents
caused by climate change will lead them to raise their prices to maintain
profits.' Such a move might initially appear only to harm consumers, but

49.

See Darwin C. Hall, Preliminary Estimates of Cumulative Private and External Costs of

Energy, CONTEMP. POUCY ISSUES, July 1990, at 283,285; Jorgenson & Wilcoxen, supra note 29,
at 135,140.
50.

See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 44, at 1060.

51.

The results of this cost-benefit analysis are indicated by the position on climate

change adopted by the insurance industry, an industry that presently stands to bear the brunt

of the costs of global climate change. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
52. Cf. Cottle v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1402 (1992) (Lillie, J., dissenting)
(arguing that failure to place the costs of injuries produced by chemicals on chemical
manufacturers will lead to higher than optimal consumption of suspect chemicals due to
artificially low prices).

53.

Several authors have called for such an internalization of the environmental costs of

energy use. See, e.g., Hall,supra note 49, at 283 (calling for "social pricing" of energy); Strauss

& Urquhart, supra note 40, at 218 (arguing that the price of energy should include the cost of
environmental harms associated with energy use); Thomas C. Schelling, Prices as Regulatory
Instruments, in INCENIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PRCTBFCION 1 (Thomas C. Schelling ed., 1983)
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raising the prices of fossil fuels would also have the effect of making
alternative, safer energy sources competitive.' If the price of fossil fuels
were to reach high enough levels, the cost of further fossil fuel use would
eventually exceed the cost to consumers of switching to alternative energies
that do not release greenhouse gases or the costs of investing in alternative
technologies that would increase the consumer's efficiency in the use of
fossil fuels.ss The result would be lower consumption of fossil fuels and a
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions toward their optimal level.'
2. Compensating Victims and PunishingWrongdoers
The injuries produced by global climate change could be potentially devastating. In some cases, such as harms caused by rising seas and
the spread of tropical diseases, the particular injuries resulting from the
build-up of greenhouse gases will be relatively easy to pick out.' In others,
such as increased damage due to a higher frequency of lightening strikes'a
or more frequent and more severe hurricanes,s the harms caused by
climate change will be difficult to distinguish from background processes.
But in either case, actual people will be seriously harmed who, but for
global climate change, might not have been.

(arguing for the internalization of costs associated with environmental harm caused by energy
production and use). Often referred to as "social pricing," the practice of internalizing the
costs of environmental harms produced by energy policy has not been analyzed from the
perspective of tort law. Schelling's analysis comes closest. to a tort approach in that he calls
for the revenue raised from environmental taxes to be paid out to parties who have been
damaged by environmental degradation. As I discuss below, moreover, the failure to conceive
of the internalization process in expressly tort-based language removes the important moral
feature of tort analysis.
54. See Thomas Sterner et al., Gasoline Tax Policy, Carbon Emissions & the Global
Environment, 26 J.TRANSP. ECON. & POL 109,112 (1992). A significant issue of distributive
justice, however, is raised by the problem of the higher energy prices that would ensue from
the implementation of the policies recommended in this paper. The negative effects of higher

energy prices on poor consumers (i.e., the costs of programs to ameliorate these effects) should
be factored in to any cost-benefit analysis of energy prices.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 116-18.
57. See Watery DisasterLooms Without EmissionsCurbs, Leaders Warn (visited July 14,1997)
<http://www.cnn.com/EARTH/9706/24/earth.summit.wrap/index.html>.
58. See, e.g., C.G. Price, Global Lightning Activity and Climate Change (1993)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with author)(arguing that
under a scenario where global CO2 concentrations doubled, the mean annual frequency of
lightening fires in the United States could increase by 40%).
59. See, e.g., How Will the Frequency of Hurricanesbe Affected by Climate Change? (visited
June 12,1997) <http://www.giss.nasa.gov/Research/Intro/druyan.02> (suggesting that with
a doubling of CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere, the frequency of hurricanes forming over
the North Pacific Ocean could double).

Fall 19981

TORT PRINCIPLESAND CLIMATE CHANGE

Tort law is often discussed in primarily economic terms.' Even
those who engage in such economic analysis, however, are often willing to
admit that there is an irreducibly ethical component to tort liability.61 This
ethical goal of the tort system is normally satisfied by compensating the
victims of accidents caused by the negligent, and sometimes morally
dubious, behavior of others.' 2 If the sole goal of tort law were the efficient
pricing or consumption of products that cause injuries, then compensation
of victims of accidents caused by those products would not necessarily be
required. But our notions of justice and fairness require the compensation
of those whose lives have been harmed by others' negligence.'
Sometimes, however, in addition to compensating victims, the goal
of justice in tort law demands that a stigma be placed on injurers." The tort

60. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.1-17 (4th ed. 1992)
(analyzing tort law in terms of economic efficiency); CALABRESI, supra note 36 (providing a
fundamentally economic analysis of tort theory).
61. See, e.g., CAIABRESI, supra note 36, at 24-26 (naming "justice" as one of the two main
goals of tort law). See also, e.g., David Fischer, ProportionalUability, 46 VAND. L.REV. 1201,1203
(1992) (describing corrective justice as one of the main policies underlying tort liability); Glen
0. Robinson, ProbabilisticCausationand Compensationfor Tortious Risk, 14 J.LEGAL STUD. 779,
789 (1985) (discussing corrective justice as an objective of tort law). For an analysis more
focused on the moral aspects of tort law, see Stephen R. Perry, Moral Foundationsof Tort Law,
77 IOWA L.REV. 449 (1992).
62. See Jules L.Coleman, Tort Law and the Demandsof CorrectiveJustice, 67 IND. L.J. 349,357
(1992). But, it is important to remember, as Professor Coleman does, that the immorality of the
injurer is not required in order for corrective justice to demand compensation of the victim.
See id. at 370. "Lack of capacity to comply with the standard of due care may free an
individual from moral sanction; normally it will not suffice, however, to free him from tort
liability." Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts (pt. 1), 1 LAW & PHIL 371, 375 (1982)
[hereinafter Coleman, Moral Theories ).
63. See, e.g., id. (describing the "annulment' of wrongful losses as one of the demands of
corrective justice); Schelling, supra note 53, at 29 (discussing the need to compensate the
victims of environmental harms). Professor Coleman attempts to place a conceptual divide
between grounds for awarding damages to a victim and grounds for imposing costs on an
injurer. See Jules L Coleman, Moral Theories ofTort (pt. 2), 2 LAW & PHIL. 5, 8 (1982). According
to Professor Coleman's theory, there are some circumstances in which corrective justice may
require compensation of a victim, but not the liability of the injurer (i.e., when the injurer does
not gain from the victim's loss). On the other hand, he argues, there may be some cases in
which corrective justice requires the annulment of a party's gain (i.e., when it is wrongful),
even if that party's actions do not injure anyone. Professor Weinrib has disputed the ability
of Professor Coleman's theory to serve as the basis for tort law. See Ernst J.Weinrib, Toward
a Moral Theory ofNegligence Law, 2 LAw & PHIL. 37,39 (1982). The situation of concern in this
article does not require one to take sides in the debate between Professors Coleman and
Weinrib. Under Professor Coleman's theory, the current situation would be characterized as
one in which the losses being annulled (i.e., the damage done to people harmed by climate
change) are related to the wrongful gains of the injuring party.
64. I am not proposing a wholly moral theory of fault-based tort liability. As Professor
Coleman has rightly pointed out, moral responsibility and tort liability are not coterminous
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notion of negligence often contains within it a feature of moral stigma.'
Attempts to impose liability on a party are often imbued with a moral
content, a desire to label the defendant as a wrongdoer. No one wants to be
called a tortfeasor, after all. Thus, even victims who fail to win monetary
damages for themselves may feel at least partially vindicated by exposing
the fault of the party they consider to be in some way morally responsible
for their injury." This moral, symbolic element of the tort system, usually
associated with defense of the fault-based theories of tort compensation, 67
is not reducible to economic arguments. Rather, moral judgment stands by
itself as an independent, though often related, goal of tort liability.'
As with the goal of efficiency, the requirements of corrective justice
in tort law are consistent with a decision to place the costs of accidents
caused by global climate change on fossil fuel companies. Depending upon
one's views of the facts of climate change, the behavior of these parties
appears to meet Learned Hand's definition of negligence. 69 According to
this definition, a party is negligent if the expected costs of accidents,
discounted by the likelihood that the accident will occur, are greater than
the costs of avoiding those accidents."
Evidence of the negligence on the part of fossil fuel companies can
be found by an analysis of the historical role that they have played in
thwarting efforts to increase the use of alternative energy sources and in

categories. See Coleman, Moral Theories I, supra note 62, at 378. Nevertheless, it would be
wrong to conclude from this that moral considerations are completely absent from all
determinations of tort liability under the fault system.
65. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 63, at 54 (characterizing the failure to live up to the
objective standard of due care as "a [moral] failure to give equal consideration to the plaintiff
and ... thus [as] a wrong directed against him.").
66. This punitive, stigmatizing aspect of tort law is exemplified most clearly in tobacco
litigation, where victims against a morally bankrupt injurer view tort law almost with the
fervor of a moral crusade. Cf. Mireya Navarro, CigaretteMakers Reach Settlement in Nonsmoker
Suit, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1997, at Al (describing plaintiffs' satisfaction with a suit in which
they received no money, because the tobacco industry had effectively conceded that, despite
its frequent statements to the contrary, second-hand smoke causes lung cancer).
67. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 36, at 301 ("It strikes critic and community as unfair
if a person injured by someone who has violated a moral code is not compensated, or if
someone who violates a moral code and is hurt is compensated at the expense of an innocent
party."). See also Weinrib, supra note 63, at 52 (interpreting the Learned Hand test for
negligence as an example of Kantian moral reasoning).
68. See Weinrib, supra note 63, at 53 ("The balancing of risk against the measures needed
to eliminate or avoid the risk stands at the junction of the paradigmatically deontological
elements of rationality in a hypothetical situation.").
69. The Hand Test is the standard test for fault-based liability in tort law. See RIcHARD
A POSNER, TORT LAw 1-2 (1982).
70. See id.
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impeding efforts to improve efficiency in energy use.71 Assuming that
global climate change is a real threat, these companies have placed the
balance of the planet into jeopardy. Despite a growing scientific consensus
that the continued reliance on fossil fuels is putting the stability of the
environment at serious risk, they have attempted to block efforts at
reducing the growth of CO2 emissions in order to protect their profits. The
more certain scientists become that global climate change is occurring, and
the more potentially catastrophic the consequences of climate change
appear to be, the more negligent and, as a result of the enormous potential
costs of that negligence, morally irresponsible the behavior of these parties
appears.
By taking some action to reduce fossil fuel consumption, the fossil
fuel companies could reduce the actual costs associated with harms caused
by climate change.' The failure of the fossil fuel companies to take any
action to reduce the risk of global climate change amounts to an assertion
that the appropriate level of expenditure to avoid climate change is zero.
Thus, if it can be shown that there is any risk that costs will result from
climate change, the behavior of the fossil fuel companies would appear to
meet the Learned Hand definition of negligence. That is, assuming that
there will be some costs of climate change,74 the refusal of fossil fuel

71. See Ross Gelbspan, Beyond Kyoto, AmcUsJ., Winter 1998, at 22,24 ("To date, fossil
fuel interests have been devoting enormous resources to confounding the public with an
appalling public relations campaign of deception and misinformation."). Of course, an
argument could be made that victims of accidents caused by climate change, have (by using
fossil fuels) engaged in contributory negligence. Such an argument is only superficially
appealing, however. The public campaigns carried out by fossil fuel companies have made
it very difficult for the average consumer to accurately weigh the risks involved in continued
use of fossil fuels.
72. Fossil fuel companies have employed public opinion campaigns using dubious
scientific research in an effort to prevent a consensus from forming around the need to reduce
fossil fuel consumption. See id. See also Cushman, supranote 1; Industry Battles Clinton on
Climate, UPI, Sept. 10,1997 (describing a $13 million industry public relations campaign to
try to prevent the United States from signing on to a commitment to significantly reduce CO2
emissions); Who's Warming the Globe?, BURAWO NEWS, Dec. 17,1995, at 8F (describing the oil
industry's attempt to create uncertainty over global warming by funding "hired guns" to
perform research). Speaking to a Chinese audience at the 1997 World Petroleum Conference
in Beijing, for example, Exxon chairman Lee Raymond urged developing Asian nations to
increase their fossil fuel use and to work with Exxon to oppose greenhouse gas reductions. See
Colum Lynch, Stormy Weather, AMCUS J., Winter 1998, at 15,17. For a thorough discussion of
the fossil fuel companies' attempt to skew public debate in their favor through the use of
questionable science, see generally Ross GELSPAN, THE HEAT Is ON: THE HIGH STA
BATrME
OVER EARTH'S THMlMT
CUMATE (1997).
73. See supra Figure 1.
74. That is, I assume that the costs of climate change are greater than 0.
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companies to spend any money to reduce the risk of such harm amounts
to a failure to show due care.
The negligence of fossil fuel producers may amount to a twist on
the claim of "negligent marketing." ' That is, the negligence of fossil fuel
companies does not result from their decision to market fossil fuels at all,
but rather from their decisions to refuse to market them in a responsible
way. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Calabresi of the Second Circuit applied
a form of the negligent marketing theory to the manufacturer of Black
Talon bullets.' In considering the application of the Learned Hand test to
the way in which Olin Corporation marketed the Black Talon bullet, Judge
Calabresi argued that if "the social utility of marketing the product to the
public is outweighed by its risk of harm," then the manufacturer can be
found liable under a negligent marketing theory." In other words, if the
costs of marketing the bullets in a less dangerous way are outweighed by
the costs of accidents avoided by the less dangerous marketing technique,
the failure of the manufacturer to adopt the less dangerous marketing
technique amounts to a negligent act for which the manufacturer can be
held liable. 5
Applied to the case of fossil fuels, the negligent marketing theory,
as described by Judge Calabresi, would result in a finding of negligence by
fossil fuel producers as long as it could be shown that costs would indeed
result from the harms associated with climate change. The negligent
marketing claim would amount to an argument that the cost for fossil fuel
producers of helping to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels is outweighed by the social costs associated with fossil fuel consumption in
excess of point C on Figure 1 above. The failure of fossil fuel companies to
market their product consistently with the cost-benefit analysis described
in Part III.B.1 amounts to the negligent marketing of fossil fuels.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH A TORT ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE
Although the two major goals of tort law point in the direction of
placing the costs of the accidents produced by climate change on the
enterprises responsible for the production of fossil fuels, several problems

75. For one discussion of the theory of negligent marketing, see Andrew J.McClurg, The
Tortious Marketingof Handguns,19 SMON HALLLEGS. J.777,799,806-08 (1995) (explaining the
theory of negligent marketing--marketing an otherwise non-negligent product in a negligent
manner-as a basis for liability for handgun manufacturers) (cited in McCarthy v. Olin Corp.,
119 F.3d 148,161 [2d Cir. 1997] [Calabresi, J., dissenting]).
76. See McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 161-70 (Calabresi, J., dissenting on other grounds).
77. Id. at 162.
78. See id.

Fall 1998]

TORT PRINCIPLES AND CLIMATE CHANGE

are likely to arise in any implementation of a tort-based approach to the
costs of climate chapge. The most serious of these problems have to do with
issues surrounding causation, determination of how much each responsible
party should pay, and the most appropriate mechanisms for administering
such a tort-based approach.
A. Causation
Perhaps the single greatest problem with using a tort-based
approach to climate change would be proving that any individual injury
was caused by human activity. In this regard, climate change suffers from
the same causation problems that plague toxic torts in general. 79 To the
traditional problems of causation inherent in any toxic tort, however,
climate change adds its own.
Before discussing how climate change differs from traditional toxic
torts, it is important first to outline the ways in which toxic torts in general
present serious problems of causation. Susan Poulter divides the causation
problem into two categories: (1) general causation and (2) individual
causation.' General causation involves the question of whether the alleged
causal factor can cause the type of effect from which the victim suffers (for
example, can asbestos in general cause lung cancer?). The issue of
individual causation, however, involves the question of whether the
alleged causal factor did indeed cause a particular victim's injury (for
example, did asbestos exposure cause this case of lung cancer?). It is this
latter notion of individual causation, normally conceived of in terms of but
for causation, that is thought to be the concern of the tort process,"' and it
is this latter causal notion that presents the greatest problem for toxic
82
torts.
The problem for toxic torts stems from the tendency of tort law,
and tort scholars, to conceive of individual causation in the mechanistic

79. See Cottle v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. App. 4th 1367,1399-1401 (1992) (Lilie, J., dissenting)
(discussing the difficulties of proving causation "in fact" in toxic tort cases). See also, e.g.,
Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts, 7 HIGH TBCH LJ. 189,198 (1992) (describing the proof
of causation as the biggest stumbling block to recovery in toxic tort cases).
80. See id. at 216.
81. See Troyan A. Brennan, Causal Chains& StatisticalLinks, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469,490
(1988) (arguing that the but for causal inquiry tends to dominate tort proceedings). See also
Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability,Naked Statistics, and Proof,73
IOWA L. REV. 1001,1019 (1988) (arguing that the causal inquiry in torts is an individualized,

butfor causal inquiry).
82. See, e.g., Cottle, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 1400 ("[W]hen a plaintiff is exposed to a toxic and
subsequently suffers some disease or injury no expert honestly can testify that the toxic caused
that particular individual to experience that particular disease or injury.").
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(deterministic) sense of but for causation.' Richard Wright exemplifies this
tendency, defining "actual" cause as a "necessary element in a set of
antecedent actual conditions that were sufficient for the occurrence of the
result."" As Wright points out, his definition is quite similar to the
definition of causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals proposed by
J.L Mackie. Mackie defines a causal claim as roughly meaning that, given
the circumstances, if the cause had not occurred, the effect would not have
occurred. That is, given the circumstances, a cause is necessary for its
effects.' Inherent in this mechanistic understanding of the world is the
notion that all events proceed, by necessity, as a result of the conjunction
of (1) a preceding state of affairs and (2) a set of universal, exceptionless,
and, at least in principle, discoverable laws of nature.s"
Poulter outlines several features of toxic torts that make this
individualized, mechanistic, butfor causal inquiry particularly problematic:
(1) the long latency period between "exposure" to the suspect toxic
substance and the victim's injury, diminishing the likelihood that the victim
will suspect the toxic substance as the cause or be able to marshal the
evidence necessary to prove it; (2) exposure at very high levels may not
result in the disease in most persons; (3) background levels of the injuries
exist; and (4) other risk factors may contribute to the victim's chances of
developing a disease (for example, a person exposed to asbestos who has
also smoked several packs of cigarettes a day for many years).'
Because of these features of toxic torts, often the best plaintiffs can
do is to produce scientific evidence-usually in the form of statistical,
epidemiological studies-pointing toward the suspected causal agent as a
factor contributing to the victim's injuries." Such epidemiological evidence
takes the form of a probabilistic judgment as to relative risk (RR), that is,
the difference in risk of acquiring a given condition between populations

83. See Brennan, supra note 81, at 471.
84. Wright, supra note 81, at 1019.
85. See J.L. MAcim, THE CuENT OF THE UNivERSE 39-43 (1974).
86. See DUP.E,supra note 34, at 178. See also, e.g., Wright, supra note 81, at 1044 (defining
a causal law as an invariable, nonprobabilistic causal connection between some fully specified
set of conditions and some result). The deterministic model of causation proceeds along the
lines of what Dupre calls "deductive-nomological" explanation. Id. To explain something
under this mode of explanation is to say that E (the event being explained) results necessarily
from C (its
cause), where at least part of C is at least one law of nature. See DUPRE, supra note
34, at 178.
87. See Poulter, supra note 79, at 198-99. See also, e.g., Dafler v. Raymark Indus., 611 A.2d
136 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1992) (describing a plaintiff who smoked two packs of cigarettes

a day for 30 years and was exposed to asbestos for 26 years before acquiring lung cancer).
88. See Fischer, supra note 61, at 1203 (noting that the problems of proof associated with
modem toxic tort cases often require plaintiffs to rely on epidemiological evidence).

Fall 1998]

TORT PRINCIPLES AND CLIMATE CHANGE

that have been exposed to the suspect factor and those that have not. 9
Given the preference of tort law for a deterministic conception of causation,
it is not surprising that many courts and scholars have concluded that
plaintiffs relying on such epidemiological evidence must show that, more
probably than not, their individual injuries were caused by the particular
risk factor in question, as opposed to any other cause.' In other words,
plaintiffs would be required to prove that the RR of a given substance was
greater than 2.0." In the Ninth Circuit, an RR of greater than 2.0 is required
for epidemiological evidence even to be adnissible.'
All of the factors that hinder recovery in toxic torts are, to some
extent, present in the case of global climate change. But in particular, the
existence of background levels of the effect and the potential of interference
from competing causes make the problem of proving causation in the case
of a climate change injury particularly acute. First, the injuries caused by
climate change involve shifts in climatic activity and not the creation of
distinctive new types of phenomena. Second, making matters more
difficult, these background levels are subject to their own natural fluctuations in frequency and severity." This occurs because there are usually
several factors that contribute to the frequency of the types of climatic

89. RR is expressed as a ratio, with the risk in the exposed population in the numerator
and the risk in the unexposed population in the denominator (e.g., if the risk in the exposed
population is twice that of the unexposed population, the RR is 2.0). See Gerald W. Boston,
Toxic Apportionment:A Causationand Risk ContnbutionModel, 25 ENVTL L. 549,613 (1995).
90. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1253
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that plaintiffs must prove that Agent Orange was more likely than
"anything else" to be the cause pf their injuries); Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld,
Epidemiological Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L REV. 732, 767 (arguing that
plaintiffs should be required to show that a particular suspect factor is responsible for over
50% of the injuries from which he suffers); Poulter, supra note 79, at 228 (arguing that plaintiff
should have to prove that the factor to which he was exposed at least doubles the background
rate of the injury from which he suffers).
91. See, e.g., De Luca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990)
(requiring Bendectin plaintiffs to establish RR of greater than 2.0 in order to avoid summary
judgment for the defendant); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387,1403 (D. Or.
1996) (requiring breast implant plaintiffs to show an RR of at least 2.0 in order to prove
causation); Manko v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 1419,1434 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (equating RR of
2.0 with "more likely than not" proof of causation); Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp.
1087,1092 (D. Md. 1986) (stating that in IUD litigation, proof of causation by a preponderance
of the evidence through epidemiological evidence required a showing of RR greater than 2.0);
Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 579 A.2d 1268,1272 (N.J. Super. 1990) (holding that an RR of 2.0
or greater is required in order for epidemiological study to support causal claim). Cf. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706,717 (Tex. 1997) (noting that epidemiological
evidence is only indirect evidence of a causal relation). But see In re Joint Eastern & Southern
Dist. Asbestos Lit., 52 F.3d 1124,1134 (2d. Cir. 1995) (rejecting the 2.0 RR requirement).
92. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F. 3d 1311,1321 (9th Cir. 1995).
93. See Broad, supra note 12.
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activity that will likely result from climate change. Thus, it will be
impossible to say with any certainty which particular lightning strikes were
caused by global climate change and which ones would have occurred
anyway.
Under the rule requiring proof that a given causal factor (in this
case, climate change) more likely than not caused a particular injury,
climate change victims would have to show that human activity has more
than doubled the risk of their injury. If for example, a lightning strike or
hurricane damaged the victim, she would have to show that as a result of
climate change, the frequency of lightning strikes or hurricanes has more
than doubled. There are, however, two reasons for rejecting such a
mechanistic, individualized approach to causation. First, it is inconsistent
with the current state of scientific knowledge" and, second, it is inconsistent with the two goals of tort law.
1. EpistemologicalReasonsfor Rejecting the DeterministicNotions of Causation
The notion of a world governed by a web of but for causation,
ordered in turn by discoverable, exceptionless laws of nature, is based
upon a largely eighteenth century, corpuscularian metaphysics." Such an
understanding of the world was set forth in detail by Locke, in his Essay
Concerning Human Understanding." Although tort law has clung to this
Laplacian notion of causation, science-and perhaps even more so the
philosophy of science-has largely abandoned this understanding for an
indeterminate, probabilistic notion of causation.' "The viewpoint is
becoming more and more prevalent," says Herbert Simon, "that the
appropriate scientific model of the world is not a deterministic model, but
a probabilistic one."" This shift from deterministic theories of causation to
probabilistic ones has been accelerated by science's embrace of quantum

94. See Brennan, supra note 81, at 471 (arguing that scientific notions of mechanistic, but
for causation are informed by a Newtonian scientific understanding that is no longer essential
to science); Margaret G. Farrell, 15 CARDozo L REv. 2183,2192 (1994) (arguing that common
law concept of causation is grounded in Lockean empiricism and mechanistic models of
causal chains which are inconsistent with contemporary scientific thought).
95. See id. at 471.
96. JOHN LOCKE,AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (A.D. Woozley ed.,
1964) (1689). For Locke, the world (as it is of itself) consists in microscopic, solid, extended
bodies in motion. See id. at 112-19.
97. See Brennan, supranote 81, at 478; Farrell, supranote 94, at 2192; Daniel Lerner, On
Cause and Effect, in CAUSE AND EFFECT 1, 6 (Daniel Lerner ed., 1965) (observing that science
now operates in a probabilistic universe); Ernst Mayr, Causeand Effect in Biology, in CAUSE AND
EFECT, supra,at 33,45 (claiming that nearly all
biological predictions are statistical in nature).
98. Herbert A. Simon, Causal Order and Identifiability, in CAUSE AND EFFECT 157, 158
(Daniel Lerner ed., 1965).
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mechanics.' James Fetzer has hailed the resultant shift in scientific thinking
as "the most striking feature of the history of science since Newton."'" The
law's failure to embrace the new scientific understanding of causation leads
it to view probabilistic, epidemiological evidence as second-best, indirect
evidence of "real" (that is, butfor) causation."1
Not only is this refusal of the law to modify its understanding of
causation out of step with scientific understanding and rooted in an
eighteenth century metaphysics, it is also epistemologically unsound. As
Dupre argues, the deterministic metaphysic is largely the result of human
prejudice derived from observations of the macro world.'" But Dupre
provides two convincing reasons for setting aside such prejudice. First, he
argues, determinism is utterly lacking in empirical support." A fortiori, its
claim that exceptionless laws of nature govern the entire universe can never
be proved. 4 But even if one ignores this logical point, Dupre rightly
observes that, although it may display predictability, the world around us
rarely displays deterministic behavior."~
Predictability does not entail determinism."° A series of highly
probable correlations could just as easily lead to the regularity we observe
in nature. Belief in determinism thus seems to be an expression of faith,
more than a well-founded belief based on solid empirical evidence. Indeed,
because of the empirical nature of the determinist's claim, it is quite
significant that the most widely accepted scientific theories are more
consistent°with a probabilistic understanding of causation than a deterministic one.'0
In the normal course of events, such an unjustified prejudice in
favor of deterministic causation does not cause tort law many problems.

99. See Brennan, supra note 81, at 481.
100. James H. Fetzer, ProbabilisticMetaphysics, in PROBABILITY AND CAUSALITY 109 (James
H. Fetzer ed., 1988).

101. See Brennan, supra note 81, at 490. Cf. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496,526 (1906)
(Holmes, J.) (rejecting a suit by the state of Missouri seeking to enjoin Illinois from dumping
raw sewage from the city of Chicago into a tributary of the Mississippi River, because
Missouri had failed to prove that the sewage was causing an increase in typhoid in St. Louis,
even though Missouri had shown that the incidence of typhoid in SL Louis had increased over

75% since Chicago began dumping its sewage into the river).
102.

See DUPRE, supra note 34, at 214.

103. See id.
104.
105.

See id. at 185.
See id. at 186.

106. Or vice versa, as chaos theory makes dear.
107.

See DUPRE, supra note 34, at 189. Cf. Farrell, supra note 94, at 2194 (arguing that the

uncertainty principle has radically undermined and replaced Newtonian, deterministic
notions of causation).
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Many torts involve events in the macro world.1" The application of this
prejudice to situations that involve events occurring primarily on the micro
level, where determinism is far less intuitively appealing, is unjustified.
Most toxic torts involve just such circumstances.
Jettisoning the notion of deterministic causation, Dupre proposes
a probabilistic theory of causation that bears remarkable similarity to the
causal reasoning involved in epidemiology. Dupre argues we should
compare otherwise fair samples (that is, samples where background causes
occur with the same frequency as they do in the general population), one
of which contains the factor under examination and the other of which
does not. If the effect occurs with greater frequency in the sample
containing the factor with which we are concerned, then that factor should
be considered a cause of the effect"re This is not to say that Dupre's analysis
is perfect. Indeed, standing by itself, its failure to include a requirement of
temporal priority makes it unappealing as a tool for distinguishing a cause
from its effect.Y But the changes needed to make Dupre's definition of
causation more sound do not alter its fundamental feature: a probabilistic
understanding of causation.
The analysis endorsed by Dupre is virtually identical to that used
by epidemiologists in their efforts to determine the causal effectiveness of
a particular factor. Epidemiologists conclude a factor is causal when it
coincides, beyond what is likely to occur by chance, with the supposed
effect within a given population."1 Dupre's definition is also quite similar
to other probabilistic definitions proposed by philosophers of science.
Suppes, for example, argues that causes should be defined as those factors
that raise the chances of their effects. 2

108.

See, e.g., Terranella v. Union Bldg. & Const. Co., 3 NJ. 443,443 (1949) (describing a

case in which a boy died due to injuries contracted while playing on large concrete pipes).
109.
110.

See DURFR, supra note 34, at 203-04.

111.

See Mervyn Susser, Falsiflcation, Verification, and CausalInference in Epidemiology, in

Under a definition whereby a cause is characterized by its tendency to raise the
frequency of its effects, failure to include a requirement that the cause precede the effect leads
to the paradoxical conclusion that an effect can also be considered as a cause of its own
supposed cause (since the presence of the effect also raises the likelihood of the presence of
its cause).
CAUSAL INFiRENC 33,37 (Kenneth J.Rothman ed., 1988). Epidemiologists generally require
that a series of additional criteria (e.g., time order, specificity, consistency, predictive
performance, and coherence) be satisfied before a relation can be considered causal. See id. at
39-50.
112. Suppe's actual analysis is far more complex. His theory ultimately amounts to a
definition of cause as follows: C (cause) causes E (effect) if t precedes t, and p(Et'/Ct) > P(Et),
and there is no such Ft" such that t" precedes t' and p(Et/CtFt") = p(Et/Ft"). See Wayne A.

Davis, ProbabilisticTheories of Causation,in PRoBABILrrY AND CAUSALITY 133,151 (James H.
Fetzer ed., 1988). The idea that a cause is that which raises the chances of its effects is also
strikingly similar to Calabresi's "causal link." Guido Calabresi, ConcerningCauseand the Law

Fall 19981

TORT PRINCIPLESAND CLIMATE CHANGE

The adoption of a probabilistic notion of causation would go far
towards solving many of the problems of proving causation in toxic tort
cases. Probabilistic, epidemiological evidence would no longer be viewed
as second-best, indirect proof of some underlying, invisible actual
causation. Rather, such evidence would be direct proof of the probabilistic
causal link itself.
At this point, it may be useful to distinguish between two concepts
in epidemiology: strength of association and statistical significance.1 3 As
discussed above, some courts and tort scholars have argued that epidemiological evidence should be required to prove that a particular factor causes
a doubling in the risk of being injured within the exposed population."'
The reason for this is that, because these courts and scholars assume a
mechanistic notion of causation, they have thought of epidemiological
*evidence as indirect proof of a causal link." To prove, by a preponderance
of evidence, that a given factor was the cause of the plaintiff's injuries, they
would require that the plaintiff establish that the causal factor was more
likely to be the "real" cause than any other factor, or combination of factors.
The only way to accomplish this proof would be by showing that over half
of the injuries of the type suffered by the plaintiff were caused by the
alleged factor.
If one rejects the mechanistic notion of causation, however, and
embraces a probabilistic one, then (for purposes of standards of proof) the
statistical significance of an association becomes much more important
than the degree to which the factor raises the incidence of the effect (that is,
the strength of association). The two concepts, though easily confused,
must not be."6 It is quite common for a factor to be weakly associated with
an effect, but for that weak association to have a strong degree of certainty.
As epidemiologist Mervyn Susser points out, "an association may be weak
and yet highly significant."" 7
For purposes of establishing a causal connection, courts should
focus on the statistical significance of data rather than the strength of
association. Epidemiologists, concerned much more about false positive
correlations than false negatives, require 95 percent confidence in order for

of Torts, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 69,71 (1975).
113. See Susser, supm note 111, at 42.
114. See supranote 90 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990)
("epidemiological studies do not provide direct evidence that a particular plaintiff was
injured by exposure to a particular substance . . . [but only provide] circumstantial

evidence.").
116. See Susser, supranote 111, at 42.
117. Id.
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data to be valid.11 s As Richard Lempert argues, however, "the values of
social science are not the values of law."" 9 Professor Lempert and others
have observed that the use of the 95 percent confidence level within
epidemiology is somewhat arbitrary and is based upon reasons that,
although they may make sense within the realm of science, are not
necessarily compelling within the courtroom. 12 Because the law is as
concerned with the possibility of "false negatives" as it is with the
possibility of "false positives,"121 the statistical significance requirements
for the courts should be neutral between the two dangers.' A confidence
level of 50 percent would accomplish this task and would still be consistent
with the requirement that admitted evidence make the "existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
... than it would be without the evidence.""
Adoption of a probabilistic understanding of causation in tort law
would open the way for claims based on accidents "caused" (in the
probabilistic sense) by global climate change. Under the deterministic

118. See Poulter, supra note 79, at 261. See also Susser, supra note 111, at 40 (noting that the
weight attached to statistical significance in epidemiology contributes to a bias towards
skepticism within the field).
119. Richard Lempert, Statistics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1098,1099 (1985).
120. See id.; Poulter, supra note 79, at 261; Daniel Rubenfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048 (1985). In particular, Lempert observes that scientists are under no
pressure to pass judgment on a proposed causal relationship and are free to wait for more
compelling evidence before reaching a conclusion. See Lempert, supra note 119, at 1100.
Courts, on the other hand, have no such luxury. They must come to a conclusion one way or
another, and so it makes little sense to withhold possibly useful evidence merely because it
fails to meet the standards of a different discipline, standards which were adopted for
completely different circumstances. See id.
121. See D.H. Kaye, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion,
73 CORNELL L REV. 54, 72 (1987) (arguing that for purposes of civil suits, false negative beliefs
formed on the basis of statistical evidence are just as troubling as false positive beliefs). The
use of a "more probable than not" standard for civil cases implies that the law is neutral
between the risk of false positives and false negatives. Science, on the other hand, is far more
concerned with false positives than it is with false negatives. See, e.g., id. at 68 (observing that
the requirement of statistical significance to 95%confidence creates a much higher risk of false
negatives than false positives). The customs of epidemiology eloquently demonstrate science's
asymmetrical worries. Epidemiology generally requires a 5% risk of error or better for those
arguing against the null hypothesis, but the risk of error is only required to be less than 20%
for those arguing for the null hypothesis. See Farrell, supra note 94, at 2210-11.
122. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 94749 (3d Cir. 1990)
(discussing the proper level of statistical significance for statistical evidence to be admissible
and calling into question blind adherence to the 5% standard).
123. FED. tX EVID. 401. See aLso Farrell, supranote 94, at 2211 (arguing that legal concerns
should dictate the level of'statistical significance required for evidence to be admissible, not
scientific concerns); Lempert, supra note 119, at 1095 (same); Poulter, supra note 79, at 261
(arguing for use of a 50% confidence level for legal purposes).

Fall 1998]

TORT PRINCIPLESAND CLIMATE CHANGE

notion of causation, victims could only recover if the accidents that injured
them were of the type whose incidence is expected to double due to climate
change."2 Only if the incidence of say, tornadoes, doubled as a result of
climate change would it be possible to claim that it was more probable than
not that a particular tornado was "caused" (in the deterministic sense) by
climate change.
If courts were to adopt a probabilistic conception of causation,
however, victims of any type of accident whose likelihood increased as a
result of climate change would be able to recover something. Causation
could be established by evidence indicating that climate change merely
increased the risk of the type of harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
would not, however, be required to show that, more probably than not,
their injury was somehow mechanistically caused by climate change. Thus,
plaintiffs would have a claim even if, as will likely often be the case, the
risk of the type of accident from which they suffered did not actually

double."z

2. The Goals of Tort Law and DeterministicCausation
Calabresi has rightly pointed out that the question of causation in
tort law is not simply a philosophical issue, and so must not only be
scrutinized for philosophical validity, but also explored in terms of the

124. See supra note 91. See also David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L REV. 2139,2167-71 (1994)
(arguing that an RR greater than 2.0 should be required for statistical evidence of causation
to overcome a motion for summary judgment by the defendant).
125. Such a rule would also require changes in the rules of evidence that have been
adopted in several jurisdictions. In the Ninth Circuit, for example, a plaintiff must
demonstrate an RR greater than 2.0 in order to have statistical evidence admitted at trial. See
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,1321 (9th Cir. 1995). Since the Supreme
Court's decision in Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc, 509 US 579 (1993), which established
the standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, lower courts seem to have taken a much more stringent approach to the
admissibility of scientific evidence in toxic tort cases in general. See Bernstein, supra note 124,
at 2139 (citing O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 1994); Elkins
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1193 (1994);
Thomas v. American Cyanamid, 7 F.3d 235 (6th Cir. 1993); Porter v. Whitehall Labs, Inc., 9
F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 1993); De Luca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 6 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1044 [1994]). But see Anthony Z. Roisman, The Courts, Daubert, and
Environmental Torts: Gatekeepers or Auditors?, 14 PACE ENVT'L L. REV. 545,552 (arguing that
courts have interpreted Daubert as liberalizing the rules for admissibility of scientific
evidence). If, however, courts were to change their approach to causation and move towards
a probabilistic notion, statistical evidence indicating an RR of less than 2.0 would provide
relevant evidence of causation and would have to be admitted under the Daubertstandard.
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goals of tort law.1 2 More important than metaphysical accuracy, Calabresi
argues, is whether the notion of "cause" in tort law allows human beings
effectively to control the frequency of accidents in the ways suggested by
the goals of tort theory."rr Thus, in addition to criticizing the but for
requirement in toxic torts from the position of philosophical validity, it is
necessary to consider the extent to which it serves the two goals of tort law
discussed above in Part Ill.
a. Reducing the Costs of Accidents
Given the fact that most toxic torts rely upon statistically based
evidence to prove causation, it is easily demonstrated that the but for,
deterministic notion of causation frustrates the goal of reducing the costs
of accidents by internalizing the costs to the actors in the best position to
carry out the cost-benefit analysis between accidents and accident
prevention."2 An example will demonstrate why this is the case. Imagine
a situation in which three factors (for example, smoking, asbestos, and air
pollution) all contributed to a single effect (for example, lung cancer), that
also occurred naturally (that is, among people who were not exposed to
any of the three suspect factors). Pretend that each cause raised the chances
of acquiring lung cancer by 40 percent. The plaintiff in this hypothetical is
a long-time smoker who has also been repeatedly exposed to asbestos and
air pollution.
If courts adhered rigidly to the rule that a plaintiff must demonstrate, more likely than not, that one of the indicated factors caused his case
of cancer (rather than any of the others, or rather than being one of the
background cases that would have occurred anyway), then the plaintiff
will not be able to recover at all (indeed, he would not be able to recover
even if each factor more than doubled the risk of lung cancer vis-i-vis the
background risk). As a result of this failure to recover (barring some
regulatory action by the state, and assuming that, as in the real world,
victims do not have perfect knowledge and cannot easily organize to pay
producers to make products safer), cancers caused by these three factors
will likely stand as externalities. Because people will over-consume the
products in question (asbestos, cigarettes, and products causing air

126. See Calabresi, supranote 112, at 105 (arguing that law is a human construct designed
to fill human needs, and that therefore "many seemingly philosophical questions concerning
cause become irrelevant to the use of that term in law").
127. See id.
128. See id. at 86-87 (arguing that butfor causation should not be rigidly adhered to when
it is difficult to prove, such as when there are multiple defendants whose actions combine to
cause a single effect).
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pollution), these externalities will produce significant misallocation costs.'
The same problem occurs if one of the causal factors (say,
cigarettes) predominates over the others such that a plaintiff who is
exposed to all three has a 60 percent chance of having acquired his cancer
from cigarettes, as opposed to asbestos, air pollution, or background
causes. In this situation (ignoring issues of contributory negligence),
everyone exposed to cigarettes who develops lung cancer will be able to
recover from tobacco companies, and no one will be able to recover from
asbestos companies or producers of air pollution. Cigarette producers
would have to pay for all the cases of lung cancer among the exposed
group, even though cigarettes are really only responsible for 60 percent of
the cases of lung cancer in that group. For the same reason as above, from
the point of view of economics, the result will be an inefficient burdening
of cigarette manufacturers and overconsumption of the other products,
with the corresponding misallocation costs.
Thus, the all-or-nothing approach to causation mandated by
mechanistic notions of butfor cause fails to serve the goal of accident cost
reduction in the case of toxic torts, where only statistical evidence over
large populations is available. The solution is therefore to allow for
recovery even when a causal factor causes a particular effect less than 50
percent of the time.' The problem with this solution is that it seems to
violate notions of fairness that stand behind the second goal of tort law.
b. Corrective Justice
Notions of justice in tort law are often considered to operate at the
level of individuals. 3 Thus, awarding damages to a plaintiff who failed to
129. From the perspective of economics, the result will be too many lung cancer cases. See,
e.g., POUNSK"Y, supra note 46, at 97-99 (arguing that the failure to internalize the costs of
accidents in the real world of positive transaction costs leads to overconsumption of the
product and therefore too many accidents).
130. See Cottle v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. App. 4th 1367,1401-02 (1992) (Lillie, J., dissenting)
(arguing that application of traditional causal conceptions to toxic torts will lead to
undercompensation of some plaintiffs and overcompensation of others). Judge Lillie
insightfully critiques the traditional understanding of causation:
The old rules of causation simply don't work-because toxics are not
automobiles or the other instruments of sudden destruction so familiar to
the law. Toxics operate at a microscopic, often submicroscopic, level. They
also typically do their damage over the course of months or years.
Consequently, there are no witnesses to the "events" linking the toxic to its
victim-no one to say I saw this toxic invade this cell and chemically alter
its composition so that a dozen cell generations later it mutated into a cancer
that then grew larger and larger until it now threatens the patient's life.

Id.
131. See David Rosenberg, The CausalConnection in Mass Exposure Cases, 97 HARV. L.REV.
849,858(1984).
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prove, more likely than not, that a given defendant caused his particular
injury seems to some to violate the principles of corrective justice that
underlie tort law.' But such a conclusion ignores the nature of toxic torts.
Because of the complex and drawn out nature of the causal
problem in toxic torts, the question of whether or not a particular causal
factor caused (in the mechanistic sense) a particular case of disease is one
to which no possible answer can be given. We simply cannot know
whether smoking caused this particular case of lung cancer.' From the
perspective of the plaintiff, then, requiring him to answer a question that
is unanswerable in order to recover seems particularly unjust. Further, as
Rosenberg observes, the effect of forcing the plaintiff to answer this
question is to shield clear wrongdoers from liability and to place the full
cost of the victim's injuries on the victim himself.' From the perspective
of the plaintiff, at least, it is not the rejection of the notion of but for
causation, but its requirement, that is a source of injustice.
From the perspective of the defendant, two arguments for the
injustice of foregoing the notion of but for causation present themselves.
First, a defendant would likely argue that it is unfair to hold him responsible for an injury to an individual plaintiff that he might not have caused.
As discussed above, however, this argument ignores the nature of toxic
torts, which makes proof of such individual causation an impossibility.
Thus, for the plaintiff to recover from the defendant without having proved
something that cannot be proven can hardly be said to be unfair to the
defendant, who is undoubtedly responsible for some injuries. If the heart of
the justice goal in tort law is reflected in the notion that victims should be
compensated and injurers should pay, then it does not seem to matter that
the two are not necessarilyjoined to each other in the same proceeding.'
A second argument by the defendant would be more sound,
however. The defendant could argue that it would be wrong for him to be
held liable in cases where the plaintiff could not prove specific causation,
because then the defendant could be held liable to all exposed plaintiffs
who suffer from the same injury, even though the scientific evidence only

132. See, e.g., Black & Lilienfeld, supm note 90, at 765 ("The finder of fact must decide
whether it is more likely than not that an individual plaintiff contracted a specific disease as
a result of exposure to a factor for which the defendant is legally responsible.").
133. See DUPRB, supranote 34, at 182.
134. See Rosenberg, supra note 131, at 879.
135. This idea that particular victims need not necessarily be joined to particular injurers
is exemplified by Coleman's proposal for a system whereby victims of auto accidents would
be fully compensated, even if their injurer could not be identified. This would be
accomplished by giving demerits to people who drive negligently, and then charging them
periodically for the costs of uncompensated victims according to the number of their demerits.
See Jules L Coleman, On the Argumentfor the Fault System, 71 J. PHIL. 473,484-85 (1974).
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indicates that he is responsible for x percent of the cases of that injury. This
objection, although certainly sound, goes to the issue of the extent of the
defendant's liability, rather than to the fact of liability itself, the issue of
concern here. Suffice it for now to say that theories of proportional liability
(that is, where the defendant is held liable for only a portion of the
plaintiff's damages in proportion to his causal contribution to injuries of
the plaintiff's type) would resolve this objection.'
B. Determining Who Should Pay and How Much
1. Two Splitting Rules
The foregoing discussion of the extent of the defendant's liability
leads naturally into a discussion of the second major problem with a tort
analysis of global climate change: determining the specific identity of the
responsible parties and how much they should pay. As was discussed
above in Part I, the cost-reducing goal of tort law indicates that courts
should seek to hold liable those parties who are in the best position to make
the price of products that lead to global climate change reflect their true
costs (that is, to include the costs of accidents produced by global climate
change within the prices of products whose manufacture and use
contributes to the problem of climate change). The second, justice-based,
goal of tort law indicates that the parties held liable should be those who
have negligently failed to address the threat of climate change and who
have taken actions to prevent other people from dealing appropriately with
this threat.
Given these goals, it is justifiable to hold liable the companies
located at the earliest stages in the process of producing and marketing the
fossil fuels resulting in greenhouse gas emissions. By holding fossil fuel
companies liable, the prices of all products dependent upon greenhousegas producing processes will be affected as well.
Because of the concentration in the energy markets, this allocation
of liability will not entail an unwieldy number of players. Just 15 companies, for example, account for 91 percent of the American market for
gasoline, the largest market in the world.137 In the coal industry, just 11

136. See Robinson, supm note 61, at 781. Of course, such theories would entail substantial
administrative burdens. The repeated resolution of the defendant's precise liability would be
both expensive and inefficient. Such concerns should be addressed, however, when
considering the proper method of administering tort-based claims for damage caused by
climate change. For a brief discussion of the issues involved in administering claims for
climate change injuries, see infra Part IVC.
137. See Mobil Edges Shell as top Gasoline Marketer,NAT'L PETROLEUM NEWS, Aug. 1996, at
136. The top ten oil companies control over 75% of the American market. See id. By way of
comparison, in the DES litigation, the plaintiffs alleged that 6 or 7 companies accounted for
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companies account for over two thirds of American output, which is
second only to China.' This concentration in the coal industry is expected
to increase in the future." But once it is determined that oil, natural gas,
and coal companies (and possibly companies responsible for deforestation)
can and should be held liable for the costs produced by global climate
change, it becomes necessary to develop a theory by which the liability of
each individual actor can be allocated.
Two liability-splitting rules seem particularly appropriate in
making this determination. The first is the theory of market-share liability,
a theory that developed in the context of mass torts and was first applied
in the di-ethyl stilbestrol (DES) litigation.140 Applied to the context of global
climate change, defendants would be held liable for damages in the same
proportion as their share of the global market for fossil fuels. This could be
accomplished by giving each fossil fuel a CO2 equivalent value. The carbon
equivalents of all fossil fuels produced worldwide would be totaled, and
defendants would be held liable for damages caused by global climate
change in the same proportion as their share of the global CO2 market. If
one defendant were responsible for producing and selling 5 percent of the
world's CO2 equivalent in fossil fuels, it would be responsible for 5 percent
of the costs of global climate change.'
A second liability-splitting rule would also be required. As
discussed above in subsection W.A.2.b, it would be unfair to hold a
defendant responsible for all instances of an injury that its product caused
only some of the time, although there is no way to determine which

90% of the DES market in the United States. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924,
937 (Cal. 1980).
138. See U.S. Coal Mining Analysed, THE MINING JOURNAL, July 12,1996, at 29. The trend
towards greater concentration can be seen in the fact that in 1976, the top 11 companies
controlled just 39% of the market. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (holding DES
manufacturers liable for injuries caused to a class of plaintiffs in proportion to their share of
the DES market). See also Hymowitz v. Ely Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069,1076 (N.Y. 1989)
(adopting the market share theory for DES liability).
141. A complicating factor is raised by the long lifespan of many greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere. As a result of this lifespan, past emissions have a cumulative effect on the climate
change problem. Thus, current producers of fossil fuels would, under this article's proposal,
be held liable for damage produced by CO2 they did not have a role in emitting. From the
standpoint of efficiency, this result is not anomalous, since the ability to internalize the costs
of climate change is all that matters (not historical role in emitting CO2 into the atmosphere).
From the standpoint of justice, however, this result may be problematic. One important fact,
however, mitigates the unfairness of using current market share as a proxy for overall CO2
production. The upward spiral in global CO2 emissions over the course of the 20th century
means that emissions from the latter part of the century have played a much larger role in
producing the specter of climate change than those from the earlier part of the century.
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particular injuries it caused. Thus, relaxing the causation requirement in
toxic torts would only be consistent with principles of corrective justice if
it were coupled with a simultaneous adoption of a rule of proportional
liability.' Under a system of proportional liability, the defendant's total
liability, determined according to a market share theory, would be
discounted by its percentage of causal contribution to the total occurrence
of the injury in question. Thus, if it were determined with a high degree of
certainty that anthropogenic climate change was responsible for a 100
percent increase in hurricane damage on the west coast of the United
States, an individual defendant's liability for damage caused by hurricanes
on the west coast would be discounted 50 percent to account for the fact
that half the hurricanes on the west coast would have occurred even
without climate change, although it is impossible to know which half.
The above examples are obviously idealized cases. In the real
world, the exact contribution of anthropogenic climate change to a given
climatic event is likely to be highly uncertain. Different models will likely
produce somewhat widely varying diagnoses. Further, the factor of
statistical significance also has a role to play in assessing the contribution
of climate change. If, for example, climate models predicted a 100 percent
increase in hurricane damage, but with only a statistical significance
equivalent to 80 percent confidence, the contribution of climate change
would probably be somewhat less than 50 percent." Although these
statistical subtleties can be quite confusing, they are not irresolvable. Their
complexity, however, does indicate the wisdom of an administrative
approach toward the calculation of liability for climate change injuries.'
2. The Problem of Time Lags
A second problem with determining how much liable parties
should pay for damage caused by climate change is presented by the
observation that many of the most serious consequences of climate change
are not likely to occur until the second half of the next century, while the
actions that will lead to those consequences are taking place right now.45
Most methods of discounting for present value lead future damages to

142. See Cottle v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. App. 4th 1367,1403-04 (1992) (Lillie, J., dissenting)
(advocating the adoption of a rule of proportional liability in toxic torts). See also Robinson,
supra note 61, at 781.
143. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 718 (Tex. 1997)
(discussing the effect of statistical significance on the overall estimate of a factor's causal
contribution to the frequency of a certain phenomenon).
144. See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of the factors weighing in favor of an

administrative approach.
145. See Ian W.H. Parry, Some Estimates of the InsuranceValue Against Climate Chngefrom
Reducing Greenhouse Emissions, 15 RESOURCE &ENERGY EcoN. 99,99-100 (1993)..
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have negligible present value simply because they take place so far in the
future.' This time lag and its effect on piesent day policy raise serious
issues of "intergenerational equity." 47 The implications of climate change
for future generations suggest that a very conservative discount rate
should be used in calculating the present value of future damage caused
by global climate change. 1' It seems plausible, as a general principle, that
the present generation should not seek speculative value based on risks
delayed to the next generation. That would be much like gambling with
someone else's money. In the case of climate change the imperative toward
conservatism is even stronger, because the risks involved are so great,
going as they do in some worst-case scenarios to the very livability of the
planet for human society.
Further, because the application of tort principles to climate change
seeks to induce behavior that will minimize the damage caused, some
mechanism must be devised by which fossil fuel companies can in the near
future be forced to make the price of their products reflect their true costs.
In other words, in order to prevent many disasterous effects of climate
change, some way must be devised for bridging the gap between present
decisions of fossil fuel consumers and the damage that will be caused by
those decisions in the future. Of course, such a goal would require

146. See id. As Daniel Esty observes, this time delay is probably at least in part to blame
for the present lack of political resolve in dealing with the issue of climate change. See Daniel
C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism,95 MICH. L. REV. 570,573-74 (1996).
147. See id. at 599.
148.

See WILUAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL WARMING (1992) (calling for a

social discount rate of zero, a choice that results in a goods discount rate of 1.5%). The subject
of the proper discount rate for cost benefit analyses with long time horizons has troubled
economists for many years. As far back as 1928, economist F.P. Ramsey argued that a social
discount rate (i.e., a preference for benefits now over benefits later, purely on the basis of a
time preference) greater than zero was unethical. See Duane Chapman et al., Rolling Dicefor
the Futureof the Planet,13 CONTEv. ECON. POL 1,6 (1995). John Rawls concurs in this opinion.
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 45 at 293-94 (1971). This position is also shared by
Tyler Cowen, who argues that consequentialist reasoning requires a social discount rate of
zero. See Tyler Cowen, Consequentialism Implies a Zero Rate of IntergenerationalDiscount, in
JUSTICE BETWEEN GROUPS AND GENERATIONS (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds., 1992).
Nordhaus, on the other hand, argues for a positive social discount rate of 3%. See WILLAM D.
NoRDHAus, MANAGING THE GLOBAL COMMONS: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 124

(1994). Although Nordhaus argues that the selection of a social discount rate is fundamentally
empirical, see id. at 125, the issue seems to be far more ethical in nature. See Tyler Cowen &
Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in JUSTICE BETWEEN GROUPS AND GENERATIONS,
supra, at 146 ("It is a moral question how much weight we ought to give the interests of
(people not yet born]."). The choice of a discount rate has a profound impact on the final
assessment of the present value of the harms that will possibly result from climate change. See
Chapman et al., supra, at 6 ("Not only does [a lower discount rate] translate into a greater
level of action, but also a greater urgency.").
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assessing the fossil fuel companies according to their risk creation instead
of merely assessing them for harm already done."'
One way this could be achieved would be for the body charged
with calculating liability to estimate the costs of the risks associated with
climate change on an incremental basis. That is, the body could calculate
the cost of climate change under varying CO2 levels. Each year (or on some
other periodic basis), the "new" (future) costs of climate change, based on
CO2 added to the atmosphere since the previous assessment, could be
calculated and charged to the defendant. The money would not be used
immediately to compensate individuals for their added risk, however.
Instead it could be deposited in an insurance fund that would be used to
compensate victims of the types of events likely to increase in frequency
and severity as a result of global warming."5 Alternatively, the money
could be used to reimburse insurance companies for their losses due to
global climate change.
3. Damage to PublicGoods
Another obstacle to the correct calculation of the costs of global
climate change is presented by damage to "public goods" or shared
environmental resources. Damage to oceanic life, for example, could
amount to an enormous externality if it were not somehow incorporated
into an assessment of damages caused by greenhouse gas emissions. Any
such damages should be monetized to the extent possible and included in
the estimate of liability for climate change. Money collected as a result of
such damage could be used to attempt to mitigate the damages to such
public goods.
4. The Problem of Reductionism
On the other hand, it might be argued that damage to shared
environmental resources may reflect an area where a tort analysis is not
useful and a more direct governmental approach becomes necessary. This
is because some harms cannot, or perhaps should not, be reduced to
money. As Radin points out, assigning monetary values to certain goods
can be inappropriate, such moral reductionism being incompatible with
their "market inalienable" value.'5 1 Intrinsic, market-inalienable value

149.
150.

See Robinson, supra note 61, at 786-87.
This idea is derived from Rosenberg's proposal for "insurance fund judgments" in

toxic tort cases. See Rosenberg, supranote 131, at 919.
151. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARV. L.REV. 1849 (1987). See also
BERNARD WRIUAMS, MORAtrrY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETMCS 94-97 (1972) (discussing the
problem of reductionism inherent in purely utilitarian thinking, of which welfare economics
is a typical example). Williams argues that Utilitarianism oversimplifies our moral experience

in order to develop a moral currency that is comparable and additive, conditions necessary
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might be attributed to certain shared environmental resources."
This objection may have more validity against completely
economic approaches to climate change (or environmental problems in
general) than against a tort-based approach such as the one laid out in this
article.' Some scholars, such as Richard Posner, have advocated a purely
economic theory of tort liability, but the one I have described includes
notions of moral responsibility. Including as it does such symbolic features
as stigmatization of negligent injurers and vindication of innocent victims,
a mixed system of tort liability is capable of going beyond a mere market
valuation of accident costs. Hence, there is less danger of the problem of
reductionism in a tort approach to climate change than there is in, say, a
purely economic approach such as the one endorsed by Nordhaus."
C. Administering a System of Tort Liability for Climate Change
The final major problem with a tort approach to global climate
change would be devising a system for administering the enormous
number of claims that will almost certainly result. Administrative costs are
part of the total cost of accidents and accident avoidance.m Thus, all things
being equal, it is necessary to try to minimize the administrative costs
involved in transferring money from injurer to victim in accordance with
the principles of justice.

in order to accomplish the "cost benefit analysis" required by utilitarian decision-making. Id.
at 94,97. In a devastating critique of utilitarian thinking, Williams says, "[Utilitarians] might
say that they were not committed to the view that the common currency of happiness is
money. But they are committed to something which in practice has those implications....
[Ultilitarianism is unsurprisingly the value system for a society in which economic values are
supreme." Id. at 96-97. For a more nuanced criticism of Utilitarianism's inability to capture
the complexity of our moral experience, see Williams's essay in JJ.C. SMART & BERNARD
WILLIAMS, UTIL RAN : FOR AND AGAiNST 77-150 (1973).

152. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Givenness and Gift: Propertyand the Questfor Environmental
Ethics, 24 ENVrL L. 1,12-14 (1994) (discussing the need to consider the ethical and spiritual
value of environmental resources, and suggesting an approach whereby environmental
resources are analyzed to some extent as "gifts.").
153. See also Coleman, supra note 62, at 357. Cf Perry, supra note 61, at 450 ("I do not rule
out the possibility in advance that a kind of moral pluralism prevails within the institution
of tort law. This might mean, for example, that pure principles of reparation are balanced
against, or at least qualified by, norms of economic efficiency.").
154. See W.D. Nordhaus, A Sketch of the Economics of the Greenhouse Effect, 81 AMER.ECON.

REV. 146 (1991).
155. See CALABRESI, supra note 36, at 225 ("Once it is decided that a particular system of
accident law will be used, the expenses of administering that system can be viewed simply
as accident costs.").
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Case by case adjudication is commonly acknowledged to be an
extremely expensive means of compensating the victims of accidents."ss In
mass torts, the complexity of the issues and the number of parties involved
seems to exacerbate this administrative problem. In the asbestos litigation,
for example, administrative costs (primarily in the form of attorney fees)
represented 60 percent of the total costs." Moreover, as Esty argues, the
more dispersed the causes and impacts of environmental harms, the less
likely individuals will be able to assert their rights through common law,
judicial processes.' The large number of (often small) claims involved in
global climate change liability implies the appropriateness of a non-judicial
administrative process.
Erroneous results should also be viewed as administrative costs.'
For this reason, the complexity of the scientific and statistical issues
involved in toxic torts has led some scholars to propose alternative
mechanisms for resolution of toxic tort litigation. Troyan Brennan, for
example, has called for the creation of "science courts" that would evaluate
scientific evidence in toxic tort cases.'W The same scientific complexity that
caused Brennan to propose such specialized courts would be present in
litigation concerning global climate change. Fact finders in a climate case
would be called upon to assess the validity of competing climate models,
whose differences depend upon arcane issues of statistics and atmospheric
science. 6 ' Rather than juries, or even a special system of courts, the
scientific complexity of those claims would suggest the appropriateness of
an agency approach to the administration of climate change claims. Such
an agency would be better able to gather the relevant information and to
develop the requisite expertise for assessing the issues at the heart of
climate-change liability. 62

156. See, e.g., id. at 161; E. Donald Elliot, Why Courts? Comment on Robinson, 14 J.LEGAL
STUD. 799,801-02 (1985).
157. See id. at 802.
158. See Esty, supranote 146, at 580.
159. Such costs are analogous to what, in the regulatory realm, Esty calls "technical
welfare losses." See id. at 585.
160. Brennan, supra note 81, at 526. Justice Breyer has also called for the use of similar
science experts. See SrEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993).
161. Different climate models can yield extremely different results in terms of projected
costs of global climate change. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 28; CLIMATE CHANGE 1995 tbl. 6.3
at 298-99 (listing a series of climate models and their different conclusions regarding the likely
rise in global mean temperature given a doubling in atmospheric CO2).
162. An agency like the one that would be responsible for administering the claims
associated with climate change liability resembles to some extent the "National Institute for
the Environment" proposed by Professor Esty. See Esty, supra note 146, at 622.
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An administrative solution would take the form of a congressional
declaration of liability on the part of fossil fuel companies and the
establishment of the proper administrative mechanism for calculating and
transferring monetary damages from these companies to those who suffer
from the accidents caused by climate change. In its general form, this
would not be unprecedented. Worker's compensation functions along
similar lines, with companies paying into a general fund that is used to
compensate injured employees."0 Similarly, the proposed congressional
tobacco settlement represents a legislative resolution of what is essentially
a giant tort.
This is not to say that an agency would not create administrative
costs of its own. Unlike courts, which already exist, an agency would have
to be built up from scratch. Offices, equipment, and a staff of full-time
experts and claims adjusters would require a substantial outlay of
resources.
Further, the nature of legislatively created administrative agencies
renders them far more sensitive to political pressures than a relatively
independent judiciary.'" Thus, an administrative solution would have to
find a way to insulate the agency from such outside interference. Nevertheless, compared with the potentially enormous administrative costs
involved in a judicially managed system, a specialized agency would be the
best means of administering climate change liability. Because an administrative solution would depend upon congressional action for its creation,
however, it suffers from some of the same weaknesses that affect other
proposed solutions to the problem of climate change."

163. See, e.g., Daniel L Driscoll & Judge Raymond P. Green, Workers' Compensation:
Proposed Curesfor Runauay Costs, N.Y. STATE BAR J., Dec. 1996, at 36. Of course, worker's
compensation suffers from a great many weaknesses, but these is no reason to think that these
are essential to an administrative tort response.
164. See Esty, supra note 146, at 633 (discussing the susceptibility of environmental rulemaking to political manipulation by polluters with money). Similar claims have been made
about the political manipulability of other federal agencies, such as the FAA and the EPA. See,
e.g., Robert M. Hardaway, Transportation Deregulation;Turning the Tide, 14 TRANSP. UJ. 101,149
(1985) (discussing the FAA's susceptibility to political pressure); David M. Driesen, Five
Lessonsfrom the CleanAir Act Implementations, 14 PACE ENVTL L REV. 51, 59 (1996) (arguing
that EPA susceptibility to political pressures has made efficient enforcement of environmental
statutes difficult).
165. Given sufficient congressional inaction, it might be incumbent upon the judicial
branch to take on the problem of tort liability for climate change and possibly to create an
institutional system, based upon Rosenberg's public law model of judicial action, for
administering claims based upon such liability. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 131, at 907.
Such institutions have been created in the past to deal with the administration of toxic tort
settlements. See also, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An InstitutionalEvolutionistPerspective,
80 CORNL L. REV. 941, 985 (1995). Schuck provides an alternative perspective on the issue
of the proper mechanism for administering mass tort claims. He believes that the judicially
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V. CONCLUSION
Considering the current deadlock over the best way to deal with
the problem, tort law does present a useful methodology for analyzing the
problem of how to allocate the costs produced by global climate change.
Although it is certainly not the only necessary policy response, addressing
the issue of who will bear what are likely to be quite substantial costs from
climate change would reflect an important step in the right direction.
Further, knowledge that they will have to bear the costs of damage
produced by climate change, even without actual assessments, would seem
likely to change what up to now has been the primarily obstructionist role
played by fossil fuel companies. Potential liability for future damages
caused by climate change has made the insurance industry one of the
leaders in the call for attention to the issue of climate change."s Perhaps by
making fossil fuel companies responsible for the damage caused by their
products, a change in their attitude can be brought about. Rather than
using their resources to block any action on fossil fuel, companies might,
like the insurance industry, move to the forefront of those seeking to take
action now to minimize the damage caused by climate change.
An administrative, tort-based solution to the costs of climate
change would also work well in conjunction with one of the most popular
of the current proposals for reducing CO2 emissions, the carbon tax.
Discussions of the carbon tax often fail to discuss the question of compensation to those who will suffer harms as a result of climate change.167 The
logic of the foregoing analysis indicates that any tax on carbon should be
used at least in part to compensate the victims of climate change induced
accidents.
A tort-based solution would differ from a straight carbon tax in an
important way, however. The application of a tort remedy would send a
clear message that fossil fuel producers will bear the costs of the damages
produced by climate change. The logic of tort liability will provide fossil
fuel companies with the incentive to market their product in a way that will

administered system compares favorably with its alternatives of a market in tort claims or a
legislatively-created agency like the one I think would function most efficiently. See id.at 980.
166. See, e.g., Christopher Adams & Leyle Boulton, Insurers Callfor Emission Curbs, FIN.

TIMs, Dec. 5,1997, at 4 (describing insurance companies" concerns over future costs of global
climate change for which they will have to pay).
167. See, e.g., Sterner,supra note 47 (describing the economic argument for a gasoline tax,
but failing to consider the compensation of victims); Peter Hoeller &Markku Wallin, Energy
Prices,Taxes and Carbon Dioxide Emissions,OECD EcoN. STu., Autumn 1991, at 91 (describing
a carbon tax without discussion of payments to victims of accidents caused by climate
change).
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minimize their losses due to climate change. An invariable carbon tax,
unconnected to the actual environmental damage produced by fossil fuels,
would fail to have such an incentive-modifying effect.
Further, the rhetoric of tort liability might make the notion of a
carbon tax more palatable to the general public.s Taxes have become hard
to sell to the American public. Requiring companies to pay for the harms
caused by their products, however, would fall outside of the rhetoric of
"taxation" and perhaps thereby escape the hostility associated with such
proposals.
Money collected from fossil fuel producing industries should be
put into an insurance fund and drawn upon to compensate the victims of
accidents identified as the types of accidents likely to increase in frequency
as a result of global climate change. Money might also be spent to shore up
insurance companies put under pressure by increased claims on their
property and casualty policies as a result of climate change or to help
people in hard-hit regions pay for higher insurance premiums caused by
increased risk of damage.
Finally, the global nature of the climate-change problem indicates
that the mechanism created to deal with its costs should be potentially
global in its scope. That is, it should be able to collect damages from
companies operating worldwide. Further, it should be able to disburse
money to victims of accidents, regardless of whether or not they are in the
United States. Perhaps a mechanism like the one I have proposed could be
administered internationally in order to provide the jurisdictional scope
necessary to avoid problems of "structural mismatches. "l' Clearly, the
need to internationalize any solution to climate change represents an

168. See Strauss & Urquhart, supra note 40, at 221-22 (arguing that the only way to
successfully implement a tax on energy is "to make the case on environmental grounds.").
169. Esty, supra note 146, at 587. Tort principles may provide a useful means of analyzing
the arguments of developing countries that they should not have to pay for more expensive,
non-greenhouse-gas-producing energies, because developed nations were able to develop
using "cheap" fossil fuels. The tort analysis used in this paper suggests that one way to
resolve this dispute would be to divide the costs of climate change among nations according
to their contribution to the anthropogenic climate change currently in the atmosphere. At this
aggregated level, an "historical" approach (as opposed to a current market share approach),
see supranote 115, to measuring CO. emissions seems feasible. Of course, this "historical"
approach should also be prospective, because projected future greenhouse gas emissions from
developing countries contribute to the damage predictions that would be used in forecasting
the costs of climate change. To some extent, however, this tort analysis is a separate issue from
what is essentially a question of distributive justice raised by many developing nations. See,
e.g., Around the Globe, Big Worries and Small Signs of Progress,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,1997, at GW9
("[Developing] nations have said that it is up to the United States and other Western nations
to cut back on emissions without imposing similar requirements on poorer countries that are
trying to catch up economically with the West.").
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enormous challenge to the effective formulation of a tort-based policy. The
complexities raised by this challenge go beyond the scope of this article,
however. In any event, the enormous contribution of the United States
towards the problem of CO. emissions and the huge costs likely to be
suffered by people living within the United States means that even a purely
internal mechanism would reflect a significant contribution to a climatechange solution.17"

170. See Lynch, supm note 72, at 16 (citing the United States as the largest gross emitter of

CO2 as well as the largest per capita emitter).

